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 Still a physician rather than a judge?  
The post-Cold War foreign and security policy of Finland 
 
TEEMU PALOSAARI 
Tampere Peace Research Institute 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article seeks to explain some of the key changes in Finnish foreign and security 
policy since the end of the Cold War. Finland’s peace policy during the Cold War built 
on a self-image of a neutral bridge-builder between East and West, that is a 
‘peacekeeping superpower’ and a ‘physician not judge’ in world politics. Since that 
Finland’s neutrality has been replaced with a peculiar combination of military non-
alignment and commitment to the European Union’s common security and defence 
policy. A change has taken place from traditional peacekeeping to military crisis 
management led by the EU and NATO. Lately, Finland has started to build a profile in 
the field of peace mediation. This article argues that these changes have been enabled by 
a recalibrated understanding of small stateness, as Finnish identity has been adjusted 
from small-state neutrality towards ‘member-state alignment’ and ‘small-EU-member-
stateness’. Consequently, the Finnish physician approach has been reconstructed for the 
post-Cold War world.  
 
KEYWORDS: Finland, Foreign policy, Europeanization, Peacekeeping, Peace mediation 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Defence Minister Enestam: ”Finland is no longer a neutral country, but 
politically allied and militarily non-aligned.”  
Interjection by MP Korkeaoja: ”That is somewhat semantics!”  
Interjection by MP Elo: That is semantics!” 
Defence Minister: “That is not semantics, that is a fact.”  
(5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001 Finland’s 
Security and Defence Policy.) 
 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War generated a situation of 
strong uncertainty where the previous foundations of Finnish foreign and security policy 
had to be rethought. The starting point was the fact that neutrality between the Western 
and Eastern blocs was no longer possible, as these blocs had ceased to exist. Since then, 
the diminishing relevance of neutrality has played an important role in the domestic 
discourse. This has paved the way for three changes in Finland’s foreign and security 
policy, which this article seeks to make sense of. First, neutrality has been replaced with a 
peculiar combination of military non-alignment and commitment to the European 
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 Union’s common security and defence policy, including participation in EU battle groups 
and military crisis management operations. 
 
Second, a corresponding change has taken place from United Nations-mandated 
traditional peacekeeping to participation in military crisis management operations led by 
the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 
Finnish peacekeeping legislation has been amended four times since the EU accession in 
1995 and currently refers to crisis management, instead of peacekeeping in its title. Also, 
present-day legislation enables participation in operations led by other organisations than 
the United Nations (UN), and the restrictions concerning the rules of engagement and 
need of UN mandate and have been loosened. 
 
Third, in the wake of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari’s 2008 Nobel Peace 
Prize, Finland has developed a profile in the field of peace mediation. As of yet, 
mediation has not been institutionalised, and it has not become an established part of 
national foreign policy. Rather, it rests on the activism of certain prominent private 
persons. However, a process of designing and developing Finnish mediation capacities 
has recently begun and such efforts played an important role in the country’s bid to 
become a member of the UN Security Council 2013-2014. 
 
This article seeks to explain these changes in Finnish foreign and security policy since the 
end of the Cold War. Its main argument is that these changes have been enabled by a 
recalibrated understanding of small stateness, as Finnish identity has been adjusted from 
small-state neutrality towards ‘member-state alignment’ and ‘small-EU-member-
stateness’. The changes have also been fostered by a reconceptualization of neutrality, as 
EU accession in 1995 has made neutrality an increasingly ill-fitted instrument to promote 
Finland’s national interests. However, despite the adaptation, some elements of Finland’s 
bridge-building function – Kekkonen’s metaphor that Finland acts as “a physician, rather 
than a judge” – have been preserved.1 This concerns in particular Finland’s recent 
involvement in international peace mediation. 
 
This article builds on two major theoretical assumptions. First, it assumes that there is a 
significant connection between national foreign and security policy and state identity. 
The key concepts of national foreign and security policy serve as the vehicles of identity 
production2, which reflect juxtapositions between ‘selves’ and ‘others’, through which 
national and state identities are produced. Consequently, foreign and security policy tells 
us how the state in question positions itself in the international system. Here, the study 
connects to a theoretical tradition in IR, which sees state identity as contained and 
reproduced through foreign policy. Foreign policy is thus a practice that defines and 
1 President Kekkonen once famously stated that Finland should work rather as a physician or doctor than a 
judge in the world politics characterised by the East-West confrontation. This buzzword has experienced a 
renaissance in the current Finnish foreign policy debate, despite the fact that neutrality has been cast aside 
in the official foreign policy and replaced with minimalist reading of military non-alignment and full 
commitment to ESDP (see e.g. Government Report 6/2004, Palosaari 2011). 
2 Wæver argues that since identity is a relational concept, that it is produced through juxtapositions between 
selves and others it is possible to identify “specific concepts which historically have come to take on 
particular importance as ’vehicles’ of identity production” (Wæver 2002, 24). 
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 manifests the difference between self and other by making certain objects ‘foreign’ 
(Campbell 1992, Wallace 1991, Aggestam 2004). 
 
Second, the article assumes that European integration has played a central role in the 
change of key national foreign and security policy concepts. The literature on 
‘Europeanization’ argues that EU-membership has an impact on national foreign policies, 
although this impact varies in different member states. Europeanization takes place not 
chiefly by complying to EU decisions, but primarily by ’softer’ means such as learning 
and socialisation, i.e. mechanisms related to identity reconstruction (Checkel 2001, Tonra 
2001, Wong 2007, Bulmer & Radaelli 2005). Consequently, Europeanization studies on 
foreign and security policy tend to rest on a constructivist world view and on sociological 
institutionalism. This tendency has been visible in the studies on the Europeanization of 
Finland’s foreign policy (see e.g. Rieker 2006, Jokela 2010, Palosaari 2011). Moreover, 
many foreign policy studies going beyond Europeanization have focused on Finland’s 
self-perception and adaptation to different geopolitical contexts (Harle and Moisio 2000, 
Browning 2008, see also Aaltola 2011 on flexible small state foreign policy based on 
“agility” and conceptual innovations).  
 
This article draws on primary material consisting first of all of official documentation 
after 1995: Government Reports (white books) on security and defence policy and related 
speeches by key decision-makers as well as legislative amendments or new laws 
concerning foreign and security policy. Government material also stems also from 
national preparation for EU intergovernmental conferences as well as from reactions to 
CFSP and ESDP development. Secondly, to give a richer picture of the national 
discourse, the official documentation on foreign and security policy is supplemented with 
the related parliamentary debate, and statements and reports of Parliaments Committees. 
Indeed, the Finnish Parliament features lively political debates – documented word by 
word – between Ministers and parliamentarians, and between opposition and government 
party members. These debates bring to the fore contrasting perceptions and ideas 
regarding, for instance, peace promotion. The parliamentary political discussion thus 
gives insight into the process, in which national dominant discourse on foreign and 
security policy is formed, and Finnish state identity is reproduced.3 
 
The theoretical approach of the article highlights the link between foreign and security 
policy and state identity. State identity is contained and reproduced through foreign and 
security policy. A key methodological implication is that it is possible to track down 
specific concepts in the foreign and security policy discourse4 that serve as the vehicles 
of state identity production. The way to study and operationalize state identity change is 
3 The quotes in this article serve as examples of the dominating way of thinking and broader changes in 
argumentation and in common understandings. Thus it is not a question of in-depth textual analysis of 
individual speeches and words or argumentative structures used therein. All the speeches referenced against 
the names of MPs can be found on the on-line databank of the Finnish Parliament by the title of the debate 
and the date, both given in the footnotes. 
4 Discourse is understood here as a macro concept: the focus is on broadly based discourses which are 
identified in relevant texts, such as nation-states’ official documents and the speeches of its leaders (Wæver 
2002, also Rieker 2004, 371). Discourse can be defined as a limited range of possible statements promoting 
a limited range of meanings which are formed and changed in social interaction. (Larsen 2004, 65).  
 3 
                                                 
 to analyse these concepts and their change, as well as how they appear in the political 
argumentation on national foreign and security policy.5 
 
On the basis of this material, the analysis will show that the key concepts of Finnish 
foreign and security policy have undergone a considerable change after the Cold War. 
Furthermore, the analysis uncovers a changed discourse on Finnish peacekeeping policy 
and a reconstructed small state conception behind it.6 As the quote from the 
parliamentary debate in the beginning of this article suggests, the meanings attached to 
key Finnish foreign and security policy concepts such as neutrality and military non-
alignment have changed.  
 
This article is structured as follows. Part I discusses the Finnish policy during the Cold 
War. Part II focuses on the changes in the Finnish peacekeeping after the Cold War. Part 
III looks at the impact of the EU’s common foreign and security policy on Finland. 
Finally, Part IV discusses Finland’s current efforts in peace mediation. 
 
 
Part I: Bridge-building and conventional peacekeeping during the Cold War 
 
This section outlines Finland’s peace policy during the Cold War. Finnish participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations became an integral part of Finnish neutrality policy and 
contributed to a self-image of a ‘peacekeeping superpower’. Additionally, Finland 
searched for opportunities for confidence- and security-building measures and bridge-
building between the Cold War superpowers. Yet, the special relationship with the Soviet 
Union limited the room for manoeuvre in Finnish foreign policy.  
 
After the Second World War Finland did not join any military alliance, but agreed to the 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union 
in 1948. Finland also declined the Western invitation to join the American aid 
programme Marshall Plan, in order to avoid arousing Soviet suspicions. The FCMA 
Treaty was a political agreement with military content: it contained a clause on Soviet 
assistance should Finland be exposed to military attack from a foreign power. On the 
other hand, the treaty took into account Finland’s desire to stay outside great power 
conflicts. (Möller and Bjereld 2010, 373; Rieker 2006, 95.) 
 
Finland was accepted as a member of the UN in 1955. Since then, conventional 
peacekeeping as part of UN operations have been a central component of Finland’s 
foreign and security policy. Indeed, peacekeeping has been perceived as an important 
factor in Finnish identity, as during the Cold War it served as a way to reconfirm 
5 See Palosaari 2011 for a theoretical discussion on foreign policy and state identity reconstruction.  
6 According to Wivel, small state security identity usually portrays the small state as promoting a 
multilateral and non-military approach to security policy based on ideals of conflict resolution, peaceful 
coexistence and just world order (Wivel 2005, 395-396). Small states are traditionally seen as the main 
beneficiaries, and thus also supporters, or international institutions because they regulate the use of force 
and reduce the importance of power asymmetrics (ibid., 395-396, Antola 2002, 74-75). In Finnish domestic 
politics, small stateness has traditionally implied a generally accepted claim for consensus in national 
foreign and security policy-making and for acknowledging the importance of geopolitics (Palosaari 2011). 
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 Finland’s policy of neutrality. In the context of the FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union, 
these forms of peace engagements played an important role in Finland’s efforts to stay 
true to its neutrality policy. They also helped to build a self-image of a neutral bridge-
builder between East and West, that is, a ‘peacekeeping superpower’ and a ‘physician not 
judge’ in world politics.  
 
Therefore, in the UN, Finland avoided taking a stand on issues that were directly linked 
to the power struggle between the Eastern and Western bloc. Finland’s first involvement 
in peacekeeping in United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) from 1956 to 1957 was 
made possible by the absence of a political clash between the Soviet Union and United 
States regarding the Suez conflict. In the Western perceptions, Finland’s freedom of 
movement in foreign policy was generally considered more or less restricted due the 
Soviet Union and FCMA Treaty. The policy of neutrality must be seen in the context of 
this relationship. It was a pragmatic choice aimed at sending a message to the West that 
Finland is “an independent democracy, not a Soviet satellite” (Jakobson 1998, 74). 
Finland’s participation in peacekeeping was from the outset linked to improving its image 
in the West (Kronlund and Valla 1996, 444–446; Möller and Bjereld 2010, 374; Rieker 
2006, 95). 
 
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the gradual development of the Finnish policy of active, 
peaceful neutrality aimed at avoiding actions that might have irritated the Soviet Union. 
This resulted in increasing involvement in peacekeeping. Following the model of other 
Nordic countries, the planning of a more permanent peacekeeping system including a 
stand-by force began. With the UN operations in Cyprus and Middle East, peacekeeping 
evolved into a part of Finland’s foreign policy profile. Bit by bit, UN peacekeeping also 
started to be seen as a part of the raison d’être of the national defence forces on the 
domestic level (Kronlund and Valla 1996, 447–448, 453; Rieker 2006, 96). Finnish 
peacekeeping also served as a way to counter the international accusations concerning 
‘Finlandization’.7 
 
During the Cold War the Nordic countries and various forms of Nordic cooperation 
provided an international forum on which Finland could safely act without risking its 
neutrality. Supporting the UN development goals and acting together with the other 
Nordic countries in the UN served as a way to gain recognition for Finland’s neutrality. 
UN peacekeeping was also considered to strengthen Finland’s status in the Nordic group 
(Vesa 2012, 6). Close association with the Nordic countries helped to counterbalance the 
relationship with the Soviet Union. Despite the different security policies of the Nordic 
countries (Norway, Denmark and Iceland being NATO members), Nordic identity 
reinforced Finland’s international status as part of the democratic and Western Nordic 
group (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta 1993, 238). 
 
In addition, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) served as 
welcome international recognition of ‘active neutrality’ and enhanced Finland’s ability to 
7 The concept referred to a “process by which a democratic nation living in the shadow of a militarily 
powerful state gradually submits to the political domination of its neighbour and finally loses its internal 
freedom” (Jakobson 1998, 85). See also Mouritzen 1988 and Hanhimäki 1997. 
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 maintain a genuinely neutral position. The bridge-building policies culminated in the 
European security conference in Helsinki in 1975 and the signing of the Helsinki Final 
Act. Together with successful peacekeeping operations, these events supported the 
emergence of neutrality as part of Finnish identity. The policies aimed at establishing 
some diplomatic distance from the Soviet Union and at sending a message to the West 
that Finland could not be considered a member of the Eastern bloc (Möller and Bjereld 
2010, 376; Väyrynen 1987, Hakovirta 1988). The meeting of the presidents Gorbachev 
and Bush in Helsinki in 1990 to discuss common policies towards Iraq and Kuwait as 
well as the CSCE Summit in Helsinki in 1992 are further examples of Finnish bridge-
building policies. 
 
The beginning of disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the waning of Soviet influence in 
the Third World made possible the UN operation in Namibia in the 1980s. Namibia has 
been considered “the fulfilment of Finland peacekeeping’s ambitions up to that time” 
(Kronlund and Valla 1996, 457). The operation supported elections leading to the 
independence of a country and was led by future president Martti Ahtisaari and a Finnish 
battalion took part in the completion of the operations assignment. In the 1980s Finland 
also participated in UN peacekeeping operations for instance in the Golan Heights and 
Lebanon. 
 
In a nutshell, Finland’s peace policy during the Cold war was centred on participation in 
UN peacekeeping and finding opportunities for bridge-building between the United 
States and Soviet Union. A key purpose of these efforts was to prove Finland’s ability to 
maintain a genuinely neutral position between Cold War rivals. The physician approach 
implied restraining from taking sides in conflicts involving hostilities between the 
Western and Eastern blocs. These elements – bridge-building, conventional 
peacekeeping, neutrality – all contributed to the construction of Finnish small state 
identity. 
 
 
Part II: Towards a new peacekeeping doctrine after the Cold War 
 
This section tackles the changes of peacekeeping doctrine, as Finland responded to the 
post-Cold War environment. Peacekeeping was the central feature of Finnish state 
identity during the Cold War. However, Finnish peacekeeping was affected by the 
superpower antagonism of that era. The end of the Cold War largely removed such 
obstacles. Yet, at the same token the global political changes, intrastate warfare and the 
momentary paralysis of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s brought new challenges to small 
states’ peacekeeping policies and international engagements (Salonius-Pasternak and 
Visuri 2006, 59; Kronlund and Valla 1996, 457). One consequence of the changing 
international environment was that Finland applied for EU membership. This had far-
reaching implications on Finnish foreign policy and state identity. Tellingly, many 
members of parliament (MP) underlined after the EU accession that the FCMA-treaty no 
longer defined the international role and identity of Finland. It was replaced by the EU-
membership, European values, non-alignment and independent defence.8  
8 E.g. MP Penttilä, MP Salolainen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995.  
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In many ways, the EU membership replaced neutrality as a tool in security policy 
(Ojanen et al. 2000, 103). During the accession period, the European Commission had 
noted that “The question is whether the Finnish policy of neutrality – even reduced as it is 
to its core of military non-alignment and credible, independent defence – might stand in 
the way of a full acceptance of the Union’s external policies” (European Commission 
1992, 22). Consequently, Finland, together with the three other countries applying for 
EU-membership at the same time, i.e. Sweden, Norway and Austria, gave a declaration in 
which it committed to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) without any national 
preconditions or constraints (Joint Declaration on Common Foreign and Security Policy 
21.12.1993). Security policy played a role also in the Finnish population’s positive 
perceptions regarding the EU accession: many Finns expected that the EU membership 
increases Finland’s security – military security included (Hokkanen 1996, 7). Since that 
the public opinion surveys by the Advisory Board of Defence Information have year by 
year (1996-2012) indicated that most Finns see the EU membership as the key factor 
contributing to the strengthening of Finnish security. The surveys also show that Finnish 
public opinion has remained positive towards the EU’s foreign, security and defence 
policies (Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta 2012). 
 
In the post-Cold War security environment, Finland’s peacekeeping activities were put 
under transformation pressure. The official domestic discourse acknowledged that 
Finland must adapt nationally to the post-Cold War security environment, for example by 
participating in the new forms of international crisis management. To that end, Finnish 
peacekeeping capacity should be renewed to meet the challenges posed by operations that 
are broader and more demanding than before. For instance, the troops must be capable of 
self-defence and prepared to flexibly form new formations required by different missions. 
The new requirements also included the development of capacities for humanitarian 
protection and monitoring missions (Government Report 1/1995). Also linked to this was 
the question establishing and training a rapid reaction force to be used in international 
crisis management. This became a topic of intense debate and disagreement in the 
parliamentary debate, as conventional peacekeeping had become an integral part of 
Finnish identity.9  
 
On the policy level, one of the first steps in the post-Cold War transformation of 
peacekeeping doctrine was to soften the division between crisis management and 
peacekeeping. This was done by introducing the concept of ‘enhanced peacekeeping’. It 
was defined as a sort of a middle ground between traditional peacekeeping and military 
crisis management. In the domestic debate, some criticized the new concept by claiming 
that it was only aimed at the domestic audience in order to smoothen the Finnish 
participation in international military crisis management. Furthermore, some members of 
the parliament questioned whether the participation in new international crisis 
management undermines the credibility of Finland as a trustworthy traditional 
peacekeeper.10 
9 Prime Minister Aho 17.1.1995, debate on the Prime Minister’s announcement 2/1994. 
10 MP Juhantalo 20.12.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 3/1995. See also Defence 
Committee Statement 2/1995. 
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In 1995, the political debate on peacekeeping versus crisis management culminated in 
Finland’s participation in the NATO-administrated multinational Implementation Force 
(IFOR) operation in Bosnia and the related new act on peacekeeping. The purpose of the 
Government’s legislative proposal (Government proposal 185/1995) was to enable 
Finland’s participation in enhanced peacekeeping in various contexts, particularly to 
deliver humanitarian assistance and provide civil protection. Finnish troops would be 
allowed to participate even if the operation in question has a mandate to use coercive 
means to implement its objectives in the context of non-cooperation from the parties. 
Furthermore, the Government proposal also aimed at making Finnish participation 
possible in operations mandated by the UN or the OSCE, but executed by other 
organisations, such as NATO. All in all, Finland’s anticipated participation in the IFOR 
operation played a key role in the amendment of the law.11 
 
The Government’s justification for the proposed new legislation built on the notion that 
the international context had changed after the Cold War and that peacekeeping doctrine 
needed to be adjusted (Government proposal 185/1995). The parliamentary debate often 
stressed the moral obligation to participate in a mission, which was to return peace and 
prevent further conflict in Europe.12 Furthermore, the Government saw that the operation 
carried wider significance in the sense that it included both NATO-members and military 
non-aligned states and hence contributed to the creation of a new international 
peacekeeping system as well as a new European security system (Government Report 
3/1995). Consequently, Finnish participation in the operation was perceived to strengthen 
the UN’s role in the post-Cold War transition period. According to Foreign Minister 
Tarja Halonen the status of Finland as a militarily non-aligned state added value to the 
IFOR operation in particular and to crisis management in general. Along with other non-
aligned countries, such as Sweden, Austria, Russia, the Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and 
Poland, Finland’s participation broadened the mission and prevented a pure NATO 
mission, which would led to “biased peacekeeping in that it would produce new divisions 
in Europe”.13 
 
IFOR also triggered a debate about the Nordic dimension of peacekeeping. Some clearly 
considered IFOR consistent with the Nordic approach, because the Finnish troops are to 
be part of a Nordic brigade.14 However, there are also different conclusions on 
Nordicness and traditions. For example a number of MPs held that participation in 
NATO-led enhanced peacekeeping undermines Finnish peacekeeping traditions and 
might lead to a situation where Finland has to give up traditional peacekeeping totally.15 
The following excerpt from the parliamentary debate describes the issue tellingly. It 
shows how Nordic and Finnish peacekeeping traditions and the Finnish image in the eyes 
11 According to the Government proposal Finland would participate in IFOR with the strength of a 
“building detachment” of approximately 420 soldiers and staff, amounting to 450 persons total. The 
reconstruction battalion was to build and repair the working and accommodation facilities needed by the 
staff and stations of the Nordic brigade. (Government Report 3/1995; Aro 2000, 54-56). 
12 E.g. MP Wahlström 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
13 Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
14 Foreign Minister Halonen 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
15 E.g. MP Saari 18.12.1995, preliminary debate on the Government Report 3/1995. 
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 of other countries are given different interpretations and how these interpretations can be 
used in domestic political debates:  
 
Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen: ”We do not yet know if the Bosnia operation will 
take place, but if it does, what shall we say to Russia, the US, other European 
states, other Nordic countries and perhaps to the parties of the crisis who are 
asking Finland to participate? Would we stay out of the Nordic peacekeeping 
force, and leave our place to Poland? […] What would that look like in the light 
of Finland’s great peacekeeping traditions?  
 
Interjection by a MP: We should concentrate on traditional peacekeeping!16 
 
 
Small stateness played a role in the redefinition of peacekeeping doctrine in the context 
of the Bosnia operation. Thus, peace enforcement was seen as a task that belongs to the 
great powers, but not to small states like Finland.17 The Government defined peace 
enforcement as military coercion targeted at a state or another conflict party with the 
purpose of repelling or striking back an attack. In the Finnish vocabulary peace 
enforcement operations also differ from traditional peacekeeping in that they are 
established without the consent of the conflicting parties. Furthermore, force can be used 
as much as is necessary for meeting the objectives of the operation.18 The general 
conclusion in the domestic debate was that peace enforcement is not suitable for Finland, 
ultimately because it is alien to Finland’s state identity. Thus, a clause was introduced 
excluding peace enforcement from the list of activities that Finnish troops can take part 
in. Abstaining from peace enforcement was thus a factor which contributed to the 
reproduction of Finnish identity related to traditional understandings of Finland as a 
neutral party that does not serve as a judge but rather as a physician in international 
politics. 
 
Five years later, in 1999, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo again triggered debates about 
Finnish peacekeeping doctrine. As a reply to NATO’s call for preliminary information 
about Partnership for Peace (PfP) -countries’ possible participation, Finland announced 
its preliminary readiness to take part in the operation with a 700-800 man battalion (Aro 
2000, 57). The government noted that Finland’s participation in the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) is in accordance with the regulations of the Peacekeeping Act, firstly because the 
operation was authorised by the UN Security Council. Secondly, the Government argued 
that it was not question of peace enforcement, since “the parties of the conflict are 
committed to the ceasefire and the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army] is committed to 
disarmament” and because “initiative and unlimited use of force is not necessary in this 
operation”. Prime Minister Lipponen further argued that peace enforcement entails the 
16 Prime Minister Lipponen, MP Pulliainen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the Government Report 
1/1995. 
17 The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Paasio 31.10.1995; Prime Minister Lipponen 
31.10.1995; follow-up debate on the Government Report 1/1995 
18 Defence Minister Taina 31.10.1995; also Prime Minister Lipponen 31.10.1995, follow-up debate on the 
Government Report 1/1995. 
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 proactive use of military force, whereas the KFOR is about enhanced peacekeeping, that 
is, the reactive use of force.19  
 
In the context of planning the KFOR mission, the Finnish Peacekeeping Act required 
further adaptation.20 A resulting key amendment was that the Act no longer directly 
stated that Finnish troops could not participate in peace enforcement. When arguing on 
behalf of this change, Defence Minister Jan-Erik Enestam referred to the problems that 
the current legislation had caused in the field during the SFOR and KFOR operations. He 
argued that the Finnish commander in the field might be faced with a situation in which 
he has to decide if a task given to the Finnish troops during the operation meets the 
Finnish definition of “peace enforcement” and consequently abstain from implementing 
the task. The Minister noted that such political responsibility should belong to the 
parliament and government, not to the field commander. Additionally, the government 
wanted to make sure that the peacekeeping legislation allowed Finnish troops to 
participate in any humanitarian operation at the request of a UN agency, such as the 
UNHCR.21 
 
Notably, in the parliamentary debates, the new peacekeeping act is not regarded as 
merely a technical adjustment, as the government suggested, but as a change that affects 
the whole Finnish foreign and security policy. Thus, it had repercussions on Finland’s 
identity in the international system. For example, the EU crisis management 
development, Petersberg tasks22 and Amsterdam Treaty are repeatedly brought up in the 
debate. Parliamentarians argued that they cause increasing pressures towards 
standardization of national legislation in EU member states. Thus, Finland responded to 
pressures caused by the evolving EU crisis management and was taking steps towards 
peace enforcement. To some parliamentarians, this was a disturbing tendency. They were 
concerned that the on-going process was taking Finland away from traditional 
peacekeeping and eroding the image of Finland as a credible and neutral peacekeeper. 
Similarly, they criticized the incorporation of the crisis management concept into Finnish 
legislation as a sign of the EU’s increasing impact on Finnish foreign and security policy. 
In their objection statements, some of the members of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee highlighted that the concept of “crisis management” brings with it 
problematic connotations regarding military enforcement.23 
 
These positions point to the durability of the ideas and norms relating to the traditional 
peacekeeping. Tellingly, in the government texts, the revisions of foreign and security 
policy are discursively constructed in a way that aims to preserve a certain degree of 
19 Prime Minister Lipponen 16.6.1999, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/1999. 
20 A working group left its report to the Defence Minister regarding amendments to the Peacekeeping Act 
in November 1999 (Aro 2000, 50). 
21 Defence Minister Enestam 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. 
22 Together with Sweden Finland proposed the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks of the Western European 
Union (WEU) in the Amsterdam treaty and into CFSP. As a result crisis management became an important 
part of CFSP. Finland and Sweden were unsuccessful in that eventually the Amsterdam Treaty came to 
refer to the ”tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace-making” instead of “crisis 
management” as was proposed by Finland and Sweden. (See Palosaari 2011.) 
23 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2000; Defence Committee Statement 3/2000. 
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 resonance with traditional small state identity elements that have their roots in the Cold 
War neutrality, bridge-building and conventional peacekeeping. It is noteworthy that 
while the Finnish population has been supportive towards the development of CFSP, at 
the same time the public opinion has valued military non-alignment highly. In the surveys 
the support for military non-alignment has ranged from 58 to 79% 
(Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta 2010). 
 
The persistence of the traditional peacekeeping as an identity element became apparent in 
the domestic debates about the new peacekeeping acts. The neutrality element was 
frequently connected to this, for instance by noting that it is a factor that gives special 
added value to Finnish peacekeeping compared to other countries. Some parliamentarians 
argued that Finland’s activities are characterized by confidence building and conflict 
resolution, whereas other countries put more emphasis on military force.24 Similarly, in 
the context of the Balkan operations, the media typically presented non-alignment as a 
positive feature that enabled the work of President Ahtisaari as a mediator in the crisis.25 
This shows that traditional small state identity elements were not easily reconciled with 
the concept of military crisis management, which professed a more robust approach to the 
use of force. This view is well described by an address of a MP during the parliamentary 
debate: “Finland is a peacekeeping superpower, but only when it comes to traditional 
peacekeeping.”26 
 
Arguments about the relationship between national defence and peacekeeping also 
contributed to the evolution of Finnish peacekeeping doctrine after the end of the Cold 
War. Although peacekeeping activities had been during the Cold War seen as an essential 
part of Finland’s the self-image of a “peacekeeping superpower”, it was not manifested as 
a significant factor in national defence. In the post-Cold War period a direct connection is 
constructed in the Government discourse between the defence of the motherland and 
peacekeeping activities abroad. The Government stated that crisis management 
preparedness must be seen as a growing component in defence policy overall, and as a 
new tool for security policy and also as an element in strengthening the country’s defence 
capability (Government Report 1/1995, 6). The Government saw that participation in 
international cooperation will contribute to national defence firstly by offering modern 
field experience and military expertise for the purposes of national defence. Furthermore, 
many Ministers have later on concluded that the crisis management operations give 
valuable experiences to the military personnel and, additionally, increase Finland’s 
capacity to receive external help if Finland becomes under an attack.27 Defence Minister 
Enestam, for instance, stated that the national defence policy consists of a national and 
international dimension.28 Additionally, he argued that crisis management operations 
enhance mutual solidarity and military interoperability between the EU members. 
24 E.g. MP Ojala, MP Oinonen, MP. E.Lahtela, 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 
20/2000. 
25 MP S.Lahtela 18.6.1999, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/1999. 
26 MP Seivästö 11.4.2000, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 20/2000. 
27 Defence Minister Taina 17.3.1997, Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on the 
Government Report 1/1997; Government Report 1/1997, 45. Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, 
preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
28 Defence Minister Enestam, 30.1.2001 (Enestam 2001). 
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 Consequently, the Minister concluded that Finland seeks for security in political 
alignment and cooperation instead of neutrality that would lead to isolation under the 
prevailing conditions.29 Therefore the Finnish Defence Forces are to have a capability for 
managing crises in unstable regions outside Finland’s borders (Government Report 
2/2001, 46-47). The Government saw that both the international compatibility and 
experiences accumulated in international crisis management reinforces the credibility of 
Finland’s national defence capability and strengthens Finland’s national defence 
resources (ibid., 57). 
 
As Finnish experiences in participation in military crisis management increased, there 
was a growing perception that international military cooperation is an essential part of 
Finland’s security and defence policy, and it supports Finland’s own defence.30 
Developing Finnish crisis management capability was justified more visibly than before 
as part of Finnish defence policy. The transformation was found necessary because of the 
“changes in the operating environment” which require the adoption of new modes of 
operation. In practical terms this meant that Finland’s international crisis management 
capacity has subsequently been developed by taking into account the EU’s troops 
requirements and crisis management policy.31 These will be discussed in the part III of 
this article. 
 
 
Part III: Transcending foreign and security policy through Europeanization 
 
This part describes the changes of Finnish policy that occurred, as the EU developed its 
profile in foreign and security policy. As described above, the adaptation of peacekeeping 
practice after the Cold War somewhat triggered a backlash and a revival of a traditionalist 
discourse. However, this proved to be short-lived. The emergence of EU crisis 
management operations and battle groups influenced significantly the transformation of 
Finnish foreign and security policy. The starting point was the Concordia operation in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March 2003. Finland also participated also in 
the Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2004.32 Moreover, Finland 
took part in two battle groups (Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian-Estonian and German-Dutch-
Finnish units).33 Finland’s participation in the EU battle groups required a new legal 
framework on crisis management. This argument was made by Prime Minister Matti 
Vanhanen, who drew a clear connection between EU crisis management and battle 
groups and the need to amend Finnish peacekeeping legislation.34 Semantics mattered 
here. The government argued that the “military crisis management” which describes the 
29 Defence Minister Enestam 30.1.2001. 
30  Defence Minister Häkämies 12.12.2007, MP Haavisto 12.12.2007, follow-up debate on the Government 
Report 2/2007. 
31 Government Report 6/2004. 
32 Finnish troop contribution in Concordia was 9 participants and in Althea c.200 participants. 
33 Finnish contribution to the German-Dutch-Finnish battle group contained i.a. 120-160 military police, 
medical company, electronic reconnaissance. In the Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian-Estonian battle group i.a. 
180-220 combat support, staff officers, protection, reneissance, military police. Government Report 8/2006;  
Government Report 2/2007. 
34 Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004.   
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 EU’s crisis management tasks more accurately than the term “peacekeeping”. Therefore, 
it would make sense to change the title of the Finnish law accordingly. The parliament 
settled on the new title: Act on Military Crisis Management.35 The way peacekeeping is 
reconceptualised is clearly influenced by European integration and ESDP. The Defence 
Committee, for instance, finds that the EU possesses unique civil and military capabilities 
for intervening in crises.36 Additionally, the Government finds that the national 
procedures and decision-making structures must be revised so it becomes possible to 
mobilise a rapid response force for the needs of the EU operations.37 There is a common 
understanding in the domestic debate that the EU battle group concept required a new 
kind of preparedness from the Defence Forces as well as more flexible national decision-
making.38 
 
All in all, in the early 2000s, the Finnish approach to peacekeeping was adapted so that it 
would be in harmony with that of the EU. There was direct time pressure for changes, in 
this case caused by the need to have the EU battle groups ready for deployment in the 
beginning of the year 2007. Pressure was further exerted by the need to agree on national 
recruitment processes as well as on the conditions of employment.39 Consequently, by 
2006, the previous national preconditions and constraints for participation in international 
crisis management operation had been cast aside in Finland. A common conclusion in the 
domestic debate is that when Finland operates in EU battle groups, as well as in other 
multinational crisis management constellations, the Finnish troops must possess similar 
rules regarding the use of force as the other participating nations. National restrictions 
came to be seen as a problem, rather than a distinctive character of the Finnish 
peacekeeping policy. Furthermore, the public opinion was positive towards Finland’s 
participation in the EU battle groups (Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta, 
surveys 2005 and 2006). 
 
This concerned also the issue of the UN mandate. Indeed, this was a widely discussed 
question in parliamentary debates on peacekeeping legislation, as the EU’s guidelines do 
not absolutely require an UN Security Council mandate for its operations. Of the 25 EU 
member states, only Finland and Ireland have a special mention in their legislation on a 
UN mandate that prevents participation in operations implemented without UN Security 
Council’s authorisation.40 Thus, the necessity of a UN mandate was increasingly 
35 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30; Rauhanturvaamislain uudistamistyöryhmän mietintö 2005 
[memorandum by the working group on the amending of the peacekeeping legislation]. 
36 Defence Committee Statement 8/2005. 
37 Government proposal 5/2006, 20. 
38 Government Report 8/2006. Defence Minister Kääriäinen 24.11.2006, preliminary debate on the 
Government Report 8/2006; MP Jaakonsaari 22.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 
5/2004; MP Katainen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
39 These external time pressures dictated the schedule of the whole legislatory process from preparatory 
work to parliament and committee handling. The eventual outcome is an exceptionally multi-phased 
political process in which the Government decides to withdraw its first proposal for the new peacekeeping 
legislation (Government proposal 110/2005 Act on Military Crisis Management) after the Parliament’s 
Constitutional Law Committee Statement (54/2005), and plans to amend the Constitution instead. 
Eventually the new law is passed as a so called exceptive act of permanent nature in the spring 2006, based 
on Government proposal 5/2006. 
40 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 31; Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 1/2006, 7. 
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 questioned in the domestic debate. Those arguing that there is no need for a UN mandate 
noted that the political climate prevailing in the UN Security Council varies and refer to 
China’s veto in the context of the Macedonia operation in 1999.41 This was opposed by 
MPs arguing that a UN mandate should be obtained for all EU operations because 
otherwise the UN’s prestige and ability to function in the future are undermined. 42 
Furthermore, some argued that without the UN mandate, the EU’s crisis management 
operations will erode international justice and undermine the EU’s status as a promoter of 
justice. Finally, some opined that EU operations without a UN mandate might lead to a 
harmful situation where Finnish resources are removed from UN operations into EU 
operations.43 
  
The Defence Committee held that it might not be possible to always obtain the UN 
Security Council’s green light for the deployment of the EU’s rapid response force, for 
instance due to an operation’s urgency or a conflict of interest between permanent 
members in the Security Council. Yet, it found impossible that the EU would use force 
contrary to the principles of the UN Charter.44 The Foreign Affairs Committee pointed 
out that the European Security Strategy and the Treaty of the European Union both refer 
to the UN Charter. Therefore, the committee saw EU rapid response forces as a way to 
support UN crisis management.45 Indeed, the ‘principles of the UN Charter’ became a 
phrase frequently referred to in the parliamentary debates as a way to position Finland 
somewhere between yes and no in the question of UN mandate and EU operations.46  
 
As Finland got increasingly involved in EU operations, it put a lot of emphasis on civilian 
aspects of crisis management. This goes back to Finland’s traditional Cold War era 
approach to peacekeeping. Thus, in the domestic self-perception Finns have always been 
“capable, levelheaded volunteer peacekeepers who interacted with locals in a 
constructive manner” (Salonius-Pasternak and Visuri 2006, 59). While non-alignment did 
not prevent Finland from participating in the EU battle groups and NATO-led operations, 
it has often led Finland to promote civilian means and non-military aspects of crisis 
management (Ojanen 2002, 168-173). Defence Minister Seppo Kääriäinen, for instance, 
stated that linking civilian and military elements in EU crisis management ensures that it 
is not about “war politics, but something completely different”.47 In similar fashion, the 
Minister presented the coupling of military and civilian actions as a unique feature in EU 
crisis management, making the EU a responsible actor instead of “a warring military 
alliance”.48 
41 MP Katainen 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004. 
42 E.g. MP Siimes 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on the Government Report 6/2004. Initially the President 
too supported keeping UN mandate. 
43 Objection statement in Defence Committee Report 1/2004, MP Laakso. 
44 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30. 
45 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 1/2006, 8. 
46 In 2006 approximately half of Finnish troops participated in NATO-led operations, and 30% were in UN- 
and 20% in EU-led operations (Salonius-Pasternak & Visuri 2006, 62). In June 2012 approximately 200 
troops were in NATO-led operations and 200 in UN-led operations. Almost 100 Finns were in EU civil 
crisis management operations and 18 in EU-led military crisis management operations (Finnish Defence 
Forces 2012). In  2011 Finland was committed to two EU battle groups. 
47 Defence Minister Kääriäinen 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 110/2005. 
48 Defence Minister Kääriäinen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on the Government proposal 5/2006. 
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In all, much emphasis has been put on the civilian dimension of EU crisis management in 
the discussions within the parliament. MPs welcomed civilian crisis management as a 
theme that is particularly suitable for Finland.49 Therefore, given frequent references to 
the civilian dimension, MP’s were able to argue that Finnish participation in EU crisis 
management does not imply a total departure from the traditional Finnish peacekeeping 
approach. 
 
Finland announced its preparedness concerning EU civilian crisis management capacity: 
“Finland is developing its civilian crisis management capacity on the basis of its national 
approach and is prepared to establish the capacity required particularly for developing the 
EU’s civilian crisis management capability” (Government Report 2/2001, 8). Together 
with Sweden, Finland continued to lobby for civilian means and non-military aspects of 
EU crisis management.50 A Government Report states that “Finland is playing an active 
role in developing the civilian crisis management capacity of the EU. Finland is also 
developing its national capability in line with the EU's objectives, especially in four 
priority areas: police, strengthening the rule of law, and civil administration and civil 
protection.” This position typically received wide backing in the domestic debate. Yet, at 
the same time the public opinion saw that participating in the development of EU’s 
defence increases Finnish security (Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta 2010). 
 
The meanings attached to the civilian crisis management in the domestic debate are 
positive. A dominant perception in the domestic discourse is that civilian crisis 
management is reminiscent of the ”Finnish” way of peacekeeping, for instance through 
its insistence on confidence building between the parties and cooperation between 
military and civilian actors. It is generally conceived that civilian crisis management 
preserves and perpetuates the heritage and know-how of Finnish peacekeeping.51 
Consequently, the civilian crisis management creates resonance between national 
understandings related to traditional peacekeeping as an identity element and the new, 
more military-oriented features of international crisis management. 
 
 
Part IV: Back to the roots? Finland and peace mediation 
 
This section looks at a feature of Finnish peace policy that emerged in recent years, in 
particular after former President Martti Ahtisaari won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008. As 
a result, Finland has developed capacities in international peace mediation and has 
promoted the institutionalisation of mediation on the world stage, for example via by co-
founding, with Turkey, the Group of Friends of Mediation.52 
49 E.g. MP Räsänen 21.3.2006, debate on the Government proposal 5/2006 (second reading). 
50 See the joint newspaper article by Swedish and Finnish Foreign Ministers Lindh and Tuomioja in 
Helsingin Sanomat and Dagens Nyheter 30.4.2000. 
51 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 10. Also e.g. MP Ojala 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on 
the Government Report 2/2001. 
52 In the UN, Finland and Turkey initiated a General Assembly resolution on mediation that widened the 
concept of mediation as an instrument that can be applied throughout the conflict cycle (UN Doc. 
A/RES/65/283 (2011), see Piiparinen 2012, 42). 
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As of now, Finnish mediation experience is highly personalized. In addition to former 
President and 2008 Nobel laureate Martti Ahtisaari, prominent individuals emphasized 
include for instance Ensio Siilasvuo, who acted as the UN’s chief coordinator of 
peacekeeping forces in the Middle East in the mid-1970s, and Harri Holkeri who was 
peace negotiator in Northern Ireland in the 1990s and served as the Head of the UN 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. Additionally, the Finnish MP Pekka Haavisto 
has participated in the Darfur peace talks as the special representative of the EU. Peace 
mediation carries high domestic appreciation, and has been connected to notions of 
political prestige and statesmanship. Experiences in mediation have also been a factor in 
presidential elections. They have been used rather successfully in the campaigns of Martti 
Ahtisaari, Tarja Halonen, Elisabeth Rehn and Pekka Haavisto. Mediation has helped 
emphasize a candidate’s presidential qualities and characteristically Finnish skills in 
international politics. 
 
Compared to other small states like Norway and Switzerland, Finnish tradition of peace 
mediation is not as well-established. Indeed, institutionalised, specialized and 
professionalised peace mediation capacity is currently limited. Neither does it rest on a 
firm legal basis, as it is the case in Switzerland (see Lanz 2012). Although domestic 
cooperation and networking has clearly started, the key actors are still scattered in 
different institutional settings. In addition to the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)53 
there is the Crisis Management Center operating under the Ministry of Interior, several ad 
hoc special representatives in the Foreign Ministry, as well as experts in the Defence 
Forces and academic networks. As a remedy, the Foreign Ministry has drawn up an 
action plan (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2011), which started the development of 
mediation capacities within the Finnish government. In the EU context, Sweden and 
Finland launched an initiative to consider establishing a European Institute of Peace that 
would engage in mediation. 
 
Finland’s current engagement for mediation is a product of the ‘Nobel effect’ caused by 
President Ahtisaari. Since then, Finland has perceived a window of opportunity: 
Mediation is seen as an opportunity for small states to contribute to peaceful development 
of international affairs. At the same time, mediation initiatives have a useful branding 
effect.54 Thus, it helps to market Finland as a peaceful and peace-loving nation 
(Piiparinen & Aaltola 2012, 96). Such images were used in the campaign to gain a non-
permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 2013-2014. In this context, mediation has 
been labelled one of Finland’s main priorities on the international scene (Kanerva 2012, 
112). 
 
As was described earlier in this article, the self-image of a peacekeeping superpower was 
anchored in a perception regarding Finland’s bridge-building efforts between East and 
West. According to it Finland has helped to prevent international crises from escalating 
into a war between the superpowers. Consequently, mediation resonates with the 
53 CMI is a non-governmental organization founded and chaired by President Ahtisaari. 
54 For example, the Country Brand Delegation proposed in its Report (2010) that Finland should establish a 
peace mediation convention dedicated to Martti Ahtisaari. 
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 traditional elements in Finland’s state identity. Thus, in the domestic debate Finnish non-
alignment is typically seen as an advantage for international peace mediation. For 
instance, several Parliament Committees have referred to the work of Finnish arbitrators 
in Kosovo and Northern Ireland, and to Finland’s contribution to developing 
comprehensive crisis management capacities in the contexts of the EU and NATO’s PfP-
programme.55 The typical Finnish understanding is that military non-alignment, active 
commitment to development cooperation and UN-led peacekeeping as well as the lack of 
imperial past make Finland an impartial third party that can play a prominent role in 
mediation (Wigell, Joenpolvi and Jaarva 2012, 103). 
 
Sometimes even the conceptions stemming from the Cold War era neutrality – the 
physician approach and bridge-building – are recycled and utilized in justifying the 
current Finnish mediation policies (see Aaltola and Piiparinen 2012, 97). However, as has 
been described above in this article, Finland is no longer a neutral country – the official 
Finnish foreign policy has since the EU accession in 1995 found neutrality an 
increasingly inapt and outdated way to promote national interest. Thus, in the current 
mediation debate, neutrality is conceptualised in a different way than during the Cold 
War. It now typically refers to “a neutral actor ‘steering’ the [peace] process in the right 
direction” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2010, 8); and not to a grand foreign policy 
position or state identity. Together with the post-Cold War understanding of small 
stateness, this view on neutrality forms the ideational basis for Finnish mediation 
policies. The example of other small states plays an important role here. The Finnish 
Action Plan for Mediation notes that Finland can draw lessons from other states’ 
practices and “possibly consider implementing corresponding structures to Finnish 
mediation activities” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2011, 20). The Action Plan mentions 
other small states Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and Belgium in this context. Another 
conclusion related to small stateness is that networking with other international mediation 
actors is vital for Finland. The Action Plan finds that the Nordic countries could act 
jointly “in certain peace processes in different segments” and “cooperate in the field of 
training” (ibid., 13). Furthermore, the Plan notes that Finnish experience and skills are 
suitable for various kinds of confidence-building on different levels and in all stages of 
conflicts.  
 
 
Conclusions: judging the physician 
 
This article has advanced the main argument that changes in Finland’s peace policy after 
the Cold War reflect a recalibrated understanding of small stateness. The 
reconceptualization of neutrality, updating of the peacekeeping doctrine, Europeanization 
of foreign and security policy as well as engagement in mediation were analysed from 
that perspective. The analysed material, official foreign and security policy 
documentation complemented with parliamentary debate, gave a vantage point to the 
process in which national dominant discourse on foreign and security policy is formed. 
55 Defence Committee Report 2/2001, 8; Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 6/2001, 12. Also MP 
Anttila, MP Lax, MP Korkeaoja 5.9.2001, preliminary debate on the Government Report 2/2001; MP 
Kallio 19.12.2001, follow-up debate on the Government Report 2/2001. 
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 The located new understandings have clearly influenced the process of reproduction of 
state identity through foreign policy. 
 
During the Cold War Finland’s peace policies focused on the conventional UN-
peacekeeping and bridge-building between East and West. Both of them helped to build 
and preserve an identity of a neutral small state. Finland aspired to be ‘physician rather 
than a judge’ in world politics and avoided taking a stand on issues that were directly 
linked to the super power antagonism. Participation in peacekeeping was linked to 
improving the image and credibility of Finnish neutrality in the West. 
 
Currently, peacekeeping still represents a key factor in Finnish peace policy conception, 
but the post-Cold War development towards crisis management has caused changes in the 
meanings attached to it and in its practices. As a result of the EU membership, Finland 
has become exposed to new practices and structures of meaning that originate in the 
ESDP and have thus transcended Finland’s traditional approach to peacekeeping. In this 
light, Finland represents a typical case of Europeanization. The Cold War era idea of 
Finland as a neutral ‘peacekeeping superpower’ focusing on UN-mandated operations has 
become challenged and sidelined. New factors have emerged from the domestic 
discourse: minimalist reading of military non-alignment, alignment to the EU, and 
peacekeeping increasingly understood as active participation in crisis management as 
defined by the EU. Also the meanings attached to small stateness have changed. Small 
stateness was made compatible with EU-membership and recast more and more as ‘small 
member stateness’. In this reading small state as an element of Finnish state identity 
increasingly refers to a ‘small EU member state identity’ and is less characterised by 
qualities such as ‘marginal’ or ‘border state’ or ‘small population’.  
 
The reconstructed small state identity entails that as a small member state Finland should 
be active in supporting further integration in the sphere of CFSP. Furthermore, mere 
technical adaptation in the domestic level is not sufficient but the small state should 
profile itself as a dynamic initiator. The small state can be an active and competent 
member of the security community EU, and can also upload its national policies and use 
the EU in achieving national foreign and security policy goals. 
 
This recalibrated understanding of small stateness is evident also in the current Finnish 
mediation policy and related capacity building. Finland is trying to gain an active role in 
international mediation. In order to achieve this, Finland looks closely at the examples of 
other small states. In addition to learning and adaptation, Finland has made initiatives and 
proposals for cooperation and networking in the Nordic, European and global context. 
The current Finnish peace policy highlights small stateness, lack of imperial past, military 
non-alignment, active commitment to development cooperation and peacekeeping as 
factors that make Finland an impartial third party in mediation. This way the Finnish 
physician approach has been reconstructed and updated for the post-Cold War world.  
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